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Introduction and summary
The proliferation of payment cards—that is, debit, credit, 
and prepaid cards—has dramatically changed the way 
we shop and merchants sell goods and services. Today, 
payment cards are indispensable in most advanced econo-
mies. According to a recent U.S. survey, the percentage 
of payment cards used for in-store purchases increased 
from 43 percent in 1999 to 56 percent in 2005 (American 
Bankers Association and Dove Consulting, 2005). For 
Europe, Bolt and Humphrey (2007) report that the num-
ber of card payments increased by 140 percent across 
11 European countries during the period 1987–2004.1 
Amromin and Chakravorti (2009) find that greater usage 
of debit cards has resulted in lower demand for small-
denomination bank notes and coins that are used to make 
change.2 Furthermore, without payment cards, Internet 
sales growth would have been substantially slower. 
Debit, credit, and prepaid cards are three forms 
of payment cards. Debit cards allow consumers to  
access funds at their banks3 to pay merchants; these 
are sometimes referred to as “pay now” cards because 
funds are generally debited from the cardholder’s ac-
count within a day or two of a purchase.4 Credit cards 
allow consumers to access lines of credit at their banks 
when making payments and can be thought of as “pay 
later” cards because consumers pay the balance at a 
future date. Prepaid cards can be referred to as “pay 
before” cards because they allow users to pay mer-
chants with funds transferred in advance to a prepaid 
account.5 (We ignore prepaid cards in our discussion.)
Recently, some merchants have started to accept 
only card payments for safety and convenience reasons. 
For example, a cafe in Washington, DC, stopped accept-
ing cash for purchases primarily because the cost of 
safekeeping cash was too expensive (Rafsanjani, 2006). 
Also, many quick service restaurants and coffee shops 
now accept payment cards to capture greater sales 
and increase transaction speed. Wider acceptance and 
usage of payment cards suggest that a growing num-
ber of consumers and merchants prefer payment 
cards to cash and checks. 
As more consumers and merchants adopt payment 
cards, providers of these products may benefit from 
economies of scale and scope. In the United States, being 
able to operate on a national level allowed some issuers 
(banks that issue cards to consumers), acquirers (banks 
that convert payment card receipts into bank deposits 
for merchants), and payment processors to benefit from 
economies of scale and scope. Some European payment 
providers might enjoy these benefits in the future as 
greater cross-border harmonization occurs with the in-
troduction of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA).6 
The primary focus of SEPA is to create a uniform frame-
work not only for card payments, but also for electronic 
credit transfers and direct debits, so that these retail 
payments can be completed in the euro area without 
intermediation by other banks. The potential advantages 
of SEPA are increased competition among a greater num-
ber of payment providers and the realization of scale 
economies and more-efficient payment instruments.7 
The increased usage of cards has increased the value 
of payment networks, such as Visa Inc., MasterCard 
Worldwide, Discover Financial Services, and others. (We 
describe how payment networks operate in more detail 
later.) Earlier this year, Visa Inc. had the largest initial 
public offering (IPO) of equity in U.S. history, valued 
at close to $18 billion (Benner, 2008). The sheer 16 4Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
magnitude of the IPO suggests that financial market 
participants value Visa’s current and future profitability 
as a payment network. One potential reason for Visa 
to change its corporate structure from a card association 
to a publicly traded company is to reduce antitrust scru-
tiny by regulators and to lower the threat of lawsuits 
filed by certain payment system participants.8 In 2006, 
MasterCard Worldwide became a publicly traded com-
pany. Also, in 2007, Discover Financial Services was 
spun off by Morgan Stanley. 
Some industry observers have suggested that the 
high profitability of payment card providers has in-
creased scrutiny by public authorities in many juris-
dictions.9 Several U.S. merchants have filed lawsuits 
against MasterCard and Visa regarding the setting of 
interchange fees. Interchange fees are generally paid 
by the merchant’s bank to the cardholder’s bank. These 
fees are set by the network—and not bilaterally nego-
tiated among the banks in the network. In addition, 
the U.S. Congress is considering legislation about the 
level and determination of merchant fees. Recently, the 
European Commission (EC) ruled that the (multilateral) 
interchange fees applied by MasterCard in Europe  
violated Council Regulation (European Commission) 
No. 1/2003: The EC said that MasterCard’s fee struc-
ture restricted competition among acquiring banks 
and inflated the cost of card acceptance by retailers 
without leading to proven efficiencies.10
To date, there is still little consensus—either among 
policymakers or economic theorists—on what consti-
tutes an efficient fee structure for card-based payments. 
In this article, we discuss several theoretical economic 
models that analyze whether intervention by public au-
thorities might improve the welfare of payment system 
participants. These models consider the costs and benefits 
of payment card usage versus other types of payments—
for example, cash—and the underlying pricing of pay-
ment services under various types of market structures 
for payment providers and merchants. We address the 
following questions in this article:
n What is the optimal structure of payment fees  
between consumers and merchants?
n Will competition among payment providers,  
networks, or instruments improve consumer  
and merchant welfare?
n What guidelines should policymakers follow  
when regulating fees for payment services?
The rest of our article is organized as follows. We 
first explain how a payment network operates. Having 
established the payment network framework, we dis-
cuss the costs and benefits of providing and using pay-
ment cards relative to various other types of payment 
instruments. Next, we review the key contributions to 
the theoretical payment card literature. We consider 
papers with models that focus on interchange fees, 
price differentiation at the point of sale, network com-
petition, the role of credit, and the pricing of payment 
services when a bank provides competing payment 
instruments. We also discuss the impact of these fac-
tors on social welfare. 
Payment flows in a card network 
A payment network must convince both a buyer 
and a seller to use its payment service before a trans-
action can take place. For the purpose of this article, 
we define a payment service narrowly as the provi-
sion of a payment instrument that is used by consumers 
to pay merchants for goods and services. The con-
sumption of a payment service requires participation 
of two distinct end-users—consumers and merchants. 
The two-sided market literature has been used to 
analyze the structure of prices paid by consumers and 
merchants.11 The price structure or balance is the share 
that each type of end-user pays of the total price of 
the payment service.12 This literature combines the 
multiproduct firm literature, which studies how firms 
set prices on more than one product, with the network 
economics literature, which studies how consumers 
benefit from increased participation in networks by 
other consumers.13 Rochet and Tirole (2006) define a 
two-sided market as a market where end-users are un-
able to negotiate prices based on costs to participate 
on a platform and the price structure affects the total 
volume of transactions. In the payments context, con-
sumers and merchants generally do not negotiate 
prices of goods and services based on the payment in-
strument used to make a purchase.14 For example, the 
prices for goods and services are the same regardless 
of whether the consumer pays in cash or with a pay-
ment card. However, when merchant fees increase, 
some merchants might refuse to accept payment cards, 
resulting in fewer potential card transactions. Similar-
ly, raising consumer fees may reduce consumer par-
ticipation. In other words, if there exists a ratio of 
consumer fees to merchant fees where more transac-
tions occur than another ratio of fees, that market is 
said to be two-sided. 
Most payment card transactions occur in three- 
or four-party networks.15 These networks comprise 
consumers and their banks (known as issuers), as 
well as merchants and their banks (known as acquir-
ers). Issuers and acquirers are part of a network that 
sets the rules and procedures for clearing and settling 





















In figure 1, we diagram the four 
participants and their interactions 
with one another. First, a consumer 
establishes a relationship with an  
issuer and receives a payment card. 
Consumers generally do not pay per 
transaction fees but often pay annual 
membership fees to the banks that  
issue the payment cards. In addition, 
many payment card issuers give their 
customers per transaction rewards, 
such as cash back or other frequent-
use rewards. Second, a consumer 
makes a purchase from a merchant. 
Generally, the merchant charges the 
same price regardless of the type of 
payment instrument used to make 
the purchase. (In some instances, 
merchants may set different prices 
for the same good or service based 
on the type of payment instrument 
used.) Third, if a merchant has established a relation-
ship with an acquirer, it is able to accept payment 
card transactions. The merchant pays either a fixed 
per transaction fee (more common for debit cards) or 
a proportion of the total purchase amount, known as 
the merchant discount fee (more common for credit 
cards), to its acquirer.16 For credit cards, the merchant 
discount can range from 1 percent to 5 percent, de-
pending on the type of transaction, type of merchant, 
and type of card, as well as whether the card is pres-
ent or not, among other factors. Fourth, the acquirer 
pays an interchange fee to the issuer.  
If acquiring markets are competitive or if mer-
chants have significant bargaining power, the mer-
chant discount approaches the interchange fee. The 
interchange fee is set by the network rather than by 
each issuer and acquirer bilaterally. The interchange 
fee has drawn antitrust scrutiny in various jurisdic-
tions on the grounds that centrally setting interchange 
fees may reduce competition and harm consumers 
and merchants. 
Costs and benefits of different payment 
methods 
Here, we explore the costs and benefits of provid-
ing and using various payment instruments. Studying 
the costs to banks to provide payment services is dif-
ficult, given the proprietary nature of the cost data. 
However, there are some European studies that attempt 
to quantify the real resource costs of several payment 
services. In these studies, social cost refers to the total 
cost for society net any monetary transfers between 
participants, and reflects the real cost of resources used 
in the production and usage of payment services. For 
the Netherlands in 2002, Brits and Winder (2005) re-
port that the social cost of all point-of-sale (POS) pay-
ments (cash, debit cards, credit cards, and prepaid cards) 
amounted to 0.65 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP). The social cost of payment services for Belgium 
in 2003 was 0.75 percent of GDP (Quaden, 2005). 
Bergman, Guibourg, and Segendorff (2007) find that 
the social cost of providing cash, debit card, and credit 
card payments was approximately 0.4 percent of GDP 
in Sweden for 2002. For Norway, Humphrey, Kim, and 
Vale (2001) estimate the cost savings from switching 
from a fully paper-based system (checks and paper 
“giro,” or a payment in which a payor initiates a trans-
fer from her bank to a payee’s bank) to a fully electronic 
system (debit cards and electronic giro) at the bank level 
at 0.6 percent of the nation’s GDP.17 Based on a panel 
of 12 European countries during the period 1987–99, 
Humphrey et al. (2006) conclude that a complete switch 
from paper-based payments to electronic payments 
could generate a total cost benefit close to 1 percent 
of the 12 nations’ aggregate GDP.18   
These numbers confirm the widespread agreement 
that the ongoing shift from paper-based payments to 
electronic payments may result in large economic gains. 
Compared with cash, electronic payments also offer 
benefits in terms of greater security, faster transactions, 
and better recordkeeping; in addition, electronic pay-
ments offer possible access to credit lines.19 Merchants 
may also benefit from increased sales or cost savings 
by accepting an array of electronic payment instruments. 18 4Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
However, these benefits to consumers and merchants 
are often difficult to quantify. 
Using U.S. retail payments data, Garcia-Swartz, 
Hahn, and Layne-Farrar (2006) attempt to quantify both 
the costs and benefits of POS payment instruments.20 
They find that shifting payments from cash and checks 
to payment cards results in net benefits for society as 
a whole, but they also conclude that merchants may 
be paying a disproportionate share of the cost. Much 
of the payment card literature focuses on the propor-
tion of the total price paid by merchants and consumers. 
In other words, economists are trying to answer the 
question: Do the sum of prices to end-users for card 
payments and their peculiar asymmetric structure re-
flect the exercise of market power by card providers, 
or do they reflect the nature of the service provided? 
In the next section, we consider how the economics 
literature has attempted to answer this question.
Economic models of payment cards   
In this section, we review some important contri-
butions to the theoretical payment card literature. The 
results from various economic models in this literature 
may differ because of differences in their underlying 
assumptions. The early models of payment cards ig-
nored strategic interactions of consumers and merchants, 
and focused on the aggregate demand of each type of 
end-user and the level of the interchange fee. These 
models were extended to include explicit consumer 
and merchant interactions but assumed inelastic con-
sumer demand for goods, no price differentiation by 
merchants based on the payment instrument used by 
consumers, and exogenous benefits from card usage. 
Several models extended this literature by consider-
ing merchants’ ability to separate consumers by charg-
ing different prices. Another set of models expanded 
the literature by considering the ability of payment 
cards to increase sales because the cards provided 
greater security and eased consumers’ liquidity and 
credit constraints. More recently, models of payment 
cards have considered network competition, as well 
as competition among different types of payment 
instruments. 
Models focusing on interchange fees
Here, we discuss the academic literature on inter-
change fees.21 Baxter (1983) considers an environ-
ment where consumers are homogeneous, merchants 
are perfectly competitive, and the market for issuing 
and acquiring payment cards is competitive. He ar-
gues that the equilibrium quantity of payment card 
transactions occurs when the total transactional de-
mand for credit card services, which are determined 
by consumer and merchant demands jointly, is equal 
to the total transactional cost for credit card services, 
including both issuer and acquirer costs, or:
f + m = cI + cA ,
where f is the willingness to pay for a consumer, m is 
the willingness to pay for a merchant when demand 
for payment services equals the supply of payment 
services, and cI  and cA are the issuer’s marginal cost 
and the acquirer’s marginal cost, respectively. A con-
sumer’s willingness to pay is based on her net bene-
fits received, bB, and is greater than or equal to the fee 
in equilibrium.22 Similarly, the merchant’s fee, m, is 
less than or equal to the net benefits it receives, bS . 
Note that this equality does not mean that simultane-
ously f = cI and m = cA . Hence, pricing each side of 
the market based on marginal cost—as would be sug-
gested by economic theory for one-sided competitive 
markets—need not yield the socially optimal allocation. 
To arrive at the socially optimal equilibrium, a side 
payment may be required between the issuer and  
acquirer. To achieve the socially optimal prices, the 
side that receives more than its cost pays the one that 
earns less than its cost via the interchange fee. 
Unfortunately, Baxter’s framework does not allow 
us to study the optimal setting of interchange fees by 
banks, since their profits are zero regardless of the 
level of the interchange fee. Extensions of Baxter’s 
model relax the assumption of perfectly competitive 
markets for payment services and consumption goods. 
We explore these contributions in turn and focus on 
their implications to the welfare of market participants. 
Schmalensee (2002) extends Baxter’s analysis by 
allowing issuers and acquirers to exercise market pow-
er but still assumes that merchants operate in compet-
itive markets. His results support Baxter’s conclusions 
that the interchange fee balances the demand for pay-
ment services by each end-user type and the cost to 
banks to provide them. Furthermore, the socially op-
timal interchange fee is not likely to be zero, even 
when issuers and acquirers have market power.23 
Schmalensee finds that the profit-maximizing inter-
change fee of issuers and acquirers may also be so-
cially optimal for a conventional measure of social 
welfare with a strong set of assumptions.24 
Unlike Baxter (1983) and Schmalensee (2002), 
Rochet and Tirole (2002) consider strategic interac-
tions of consumers and merchants. In their model,  
issuers have market power, but acquirers operate in 
competitive markets. Thus, any increases in inter-
change fees are passed on to merchants completely. 
They consider two identical Hotelling merchants25  19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
in terms of their net benefits of accepting a payment 
card for sales (that is, they have the same bS) and the 
goods that they sell. Consumers face the same fixed 
fee, f, but are heterogeneous in terms of the net benefits, 
bB   , they derive from using the payment card. Only con-
sumers with b f B ≥    will adopt a payment card and use 
it for all purchases. Furthermore, Rochet and Tirole 
(2002) assume that the total number of transactions is 
fixed and changes in the prices of payment services 
do not affect the demand for consumption goods. 
Rochet and Tirole (2002) have three main results. 
The first result is that their socially optimal interchange 
fee is higher than the socially optimal Baxter (1983) 
interchange fee, since issuers exert their market pow-
er and capture merchants’ surplus. Their second result 
is that the interchange fee that maximized profit for 
the issuers may be more than or equal to the socially 
optimal interchange fee, depending on the issuers’ mar-
gins and the cardholders’ surplus. Third, merchants 
are willing to pay more than their net benefit if they 
can steal customers from their competitors or retain 
their customers by accepting cards.26 However, over-
all social welfare does not improve when merchants 
steal customers from their competitors by accepting 
payment cards. 
Wright (2004) extends Rochet and Tirole (2002) 
by considering a continuum of industries where mer-
chants in different industries receive different benefits 
from accepting cards. His model is better able to cap-
ture the trade-off between consumer benefits and mer-
chant acceptance when the interchange fee is increased 
because some merchants will not accept cards. This is 
in stark contrast to the knife-edge decision to accept or 
reject cards by all merchants obtained by Rochet and 
Tirole (2002). In Wright’s (2004) environment, both 
consumer and merchant fees are per transaction. Each 
consumer buys goods from each industry. Issuers and 
acquirers operate in markets with imperfect competi-
tion. Wright (2004) assumes that consumers face the 
same price regardless of which instrument they use to 
make the purchase. 
Wright (2004) concludes that the interchange fee 
that maximizes overall social welfare may be higher 
or lower than the interchange fee that maximizes the 
number of transactions. In particular, restricting the 
total number of transactions by setting higher inter-
change fees raises total welfare if the gain in surplus 
of the marginal card user who now starts using his card, 
along with all those merchants who accept his card, 
exceeds the loss in surplus of the inframarginal mer-
chant who now stops accepting cards, along with all 
those card users who can no longer use their cards for 
purchases at her store. To be socially optimal, the fee 
structure should reflect this asymmetry in inframarginal 
benefits, something that a card provider’s private 
choice of interchange fee may not take into account.
Models with price differentiation at the point of sale
The models discussed so far have largely ignored 
the ability of merchants to pass on part or all of their 
payment cost to consumers—whether in the form of 
higher prices to their card-based consumers or as a 
higher uniform price to all consumers.27 In some cases, 
merchants are not allowed to add a surcharge for pay-
ment card transactions because of legal or contractual 
restrictions.28 However, in jurisdictions where merchants 
are free to set higher prices for purchases made with 
payment cards, they usually do not.29 Even if differen-
tial pricing based on the payment instrument used is 
not common, the possibility to do so may enhance the 
merchants’ bargaining power in negotiating their fees. 
If merchants charged different prices, cash-paying con-
sumers would either not subsidize or only partially subsi-
dize merchant fees for processing card transactions.30 
Wright (2003) extends Rochet and Tirole (2002) 
to consider the effects of no-surcharge rules when 
merchants are monopolists or Bertrand competitors.31 
Wright (2003) assumes that each consumer demands 
a unit of each good that makes up a basket of con-
sumption goods. Similar to the consumers and mer-
chants in Rochet and Tirole (2002), consumers are 
heterogeneous in terms of the benefits they receive 
from using cards, and merchants are homogenous in 
terms of the benefits they receive from card accep-
tance. Another key assumption is that consumers and 
merchants make their decisions to participate in pay-
ment networks prior to knowing goods prices.
Wright (2003) finds that no-surcharge rules gen-
erate higher welfare than when monopolist merchants 
are allowed to set prices based on the payment instru-
ment used.32 He argues that merchants are able to ex-
tract consumers’ surplus ex post from payment card 
users, while cash users are unaffected. This result is 
driven by cash users paying the same price regardless 
of whether there is one price or multiple prices for the 
same good. Thus, cash users are made no worse off 
by differentiated prices. Because the monopolist mer-
chant has already fully extracted surpluses from con-
sumers who use cash when setting one price, an increase 
in the cash price would result in these consumers not 
making any purchases because of their inelastic demand 
for each good. Wright (2003) only considers equilibriums 
where merchants will continue to sell to cash users. 
When merchants are allowed to surcharge, they extract 
“too much” surplus ex post from customers who use 
payment cards because merchants set higher prices 20 4Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
for card purchases. This results in lower welfare for 
the remaining consumers making card purchases com-
pared with the scenario in which merchants set one price 
regardless of payment instrument used. In addition, 
some card customers in a uniform price environment 
convert to cash in an environment that differentiates 
prices depending on which payment instrument is 
used; this conversion results in a complete loss of 
these consumers’ surplus. 
Schwartz and Vincent (2006) study the distribu-
tional effects among cash and card users with and with-
out no-surcharge rules.33 They relax the assumption 
that the demand for the consumption good is fixed. 
However, they assume that consumers are exogenously 
divided into cash and card users and cannot switch 
into the other group. In this environment, if merchants 
charge one price regardless of the instrument used, 
the price rises for cash users because merchants have 
to support more expensive card purchases. Unlike 
previous models, their model considers the issuer and 
acquirer as one entity. While they are unable to ex-
plicitly model interchange fees, they are able to study 
the price structure of payment services. If either the 
issuing or acquiring market is competitive, results  
obtained in this setting would be identical to those 
derived in a four-party network. 
Schwartz and Vincent find that the absence of 
pricing based on the payment instrument used increases 
network profit and harms cash users and merchants. 
The payment network prefers to limit the merchant’s 
ability to separate card and cash users by forcing mer-
chants to charge a uniform price to all of its customers. 
When feasible, the payment network prefers rebates 
(negative per transaction fees) given to card users.34 
Granting such rebates boosts card user demand while 
simultaneously forcing merchants to absorb part of 
the corresponding rise in the merchant fee, since any 
resulting increase in the uniform good’s price must 
apply equally to cash users. In this way, the network 
uses rebates to indirectly extract surplus from cash-
paying customers in the form of higher prices. If rebates 
are feasible, card users are always better off. Overall 
welfare rises if the ratio of cash users to card users is 
sufficiently large and merchants’ net benefits from card 
acceptance are sufficiently high. 
Gans and King (2003) argue that, as long as there 
is a form of “payment separation,” the interchange 
fee is neutral regardless of the market power of mer-
chants, issuers, and acquirers. The interchange fee is 
said to be neutral if a change in the interchange fee 
does not change the quantity of consumer purchases 
and the profit level of merchants and banks. When 
surcharging is costless, merchants will implement 
pricing based on the payment instrument used, taking 
away the potential for cross-subsidization across pay-
ment instruments and removing the interchange fee’s 
role in balancing the demands of consumers and mer-
chants. In effect, the cost pass-through is such that 
lower consumer card fees (due to higher interchange 
fees) are exactly offset by higher goods prices from 
merchants. Payment separation can occur if one of the 
following is satisfied: There are competitive merchants, 
and they separate into cash-accepting or card-accept-
ing categories, in which each merchant only serves 
one type of customer and is prevented from charging 
different prices; or merchants are able to fully separate 
customers who use cash from those who use cards by 
charging different prices. Therefore, Gans and King 
argue that policymakers should remove any merchant 
pricing restrictions, such as no-surcharge rules. 
Models with competition between networks
We have not yet considered models where com-
petition among payment networks is explored. Economic 
theory suggests that competition generally reduces 
prices, increases output, and improves welfare. How-
ever, with two-sided markets, competition may yield 
an inefficient price structure. A key aspect of network 
competition is the ability of end-users to participate 
in more than one network. When end-users participate 
in more than one network, they are said to be “multi-
homing.” If they connect only to one network, they 
are said to be “singlehoming.” As a general finding, 
competing networks try to attract end-users who tend 
to singlehome, since attracting them determines which 
network has the greater volume of business. Accord-
ingly, the price structure is tilted in favor of end-users 
who singlehome.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) extend their previous 
work by considering network competition. Their pri-
mary focus is on the price structure or balance between 
consumers and merchants in a three-party network. 
They do not explicitly model the interchange fee but 
study the impact of competition on the structure of 
prices. Under a set of plausible assumptions they find 
that the price structures for a monopoly network and 
competing platforms are the same, and if the sellers’ 
demand is linear, this price structure in the two envi-
ronments generates the highest welfare under a bal-
anced budget condition. 
Guthrie and Wright (2007) extend Rochet and  
Tirole (2003) by assuming that consumers are able to 
hold one or both payment cards and that merchants are 
motivated by “business stealing” in deciding whether 
to accept payment cards in a four-party network. They 
only consider networks that provide identical payment 
services, and they find that network competition  21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
results in higher interchange fees than those that would 
be socially optimal. Competition results in both net-
works charging the same interchange fee or all trans-
actions occurring on one network. This result is not 
surprising given that both networks offer identical 
payment products. 
Chakravorti and Roson (2006) extend Rochet 
and Tirole (2003) by considering the effects of network 
competition on total price and on price structure where 
networks offer differentiated products. They only al-
low consumers to participate in one card network, where-
as merchants may choose to participate in more than 
one network. They compare welfare properties when 
these two networks operate as competitors and as a 
cartel where each network retains demand for its prod-
ucts from end-users. Like Rochet and Tirole (2003) 
and Guthrie and Wright (2007), they find that compe-
tition does not necessarily improve or worsen the bal-
ance of consumer and merchant fees from the socially 
optimal one. There are other fee structures for a given 
sum of consumer and merchant fees that would improve 
consumer and merchant welfare. However, they find 
that the welfare gain from the drop in the sum of the fees 
from competition is generally larger than the potential 
decrease in welfare from less efficient fee structures.
Models accounting for the role of credit
So far, we have considered models that ignore 
the extension of credit as a benefit to consumers and 
merchants.35 Given the high level of antitrust scrutiny 
targeted toward credit card networks, we find this 
omission in most of the academic literature surprising. 
In the long run, aggregate consumption over consumers’ 
lives may not differ because of access to credit, but 
such access may enable consumption smoothing that 
increases consumers’ utility. From a merchant’s per-
spective, extension of credit may lead to intertemporal 
business stealing. In other words, merchants attract 
consumers who do not have funds today by accepting 
credit cards, resulting in merchants tomorrow being  
unable to make sales to consumers who bought today 
on credit. In addition to extracting surplus from all 
consumers and merchants, banks have an additional 
source of surplus—liquidity-constrained consumers. 
How much surplus can be extracted depends on how 
much liquidity-constrained consumers discount tomor-
row’s consumption. 
We define liquidity-constrained consumers as those 
who do not have funds at the time of purchase. These 
models consider a positive probability that some con-
sumers will be unable to meet their credit obligations. 
The cost of these consumer defaults may be passed 
on by banks to merchants, certain types of consumers, 
or both. Both models discussed here consider a differ-
ent extreme in terms of who ultimately pays for the 
credit card services, including the cost of credit default. 
Chakravorti and Emmons (2003) consider the 
costs and benefits of consumer credit in a four-party 
network where consumers are subject to income shocks 
after making their credit card purchases and some are 
unable to pay their credit card debt. To our knowledge, 
they are the first to link the insurance aspect of credit 
cards to their payment component. All markets for goods 
and payment services are assumed to be competitive. 
Observing that over 75 percent of U.S. card issuer 
revenue is derived from cash-constrained consumers, 
they consider the viability of the credit card system  
if it were completely funded by these types of con-
sumers.36 Note that their model does not assume zero 
interchange fees, but assumes that merchants fully pass 
on their payment costs to consumers. They impose an 
incentive constraint on individuals without liquidity 
constraints such that they will only use cards if they are 
guaranteed the same level of consumption were they 
to use cash. Such a constraint allows them to study 
the convenience use of credit cards—that is, the usage 
by those who do not need credit to make purchases. 
Chakravorti and Emmons derive three main re-
sults. First, if consumers sufficiently discount future 
consumption, liquidity-constrained consumers who 
do not default would be willing to pay all credit card 
network costs ex ante, resulting in all consumers be-
ing better off. The key assumption is that at least a 
certain number of consumers face binding liquidity 
constraints and do not default. Second, if merchants 
charge a single price for a good regardless of how 
consumers pay, and if there are no side payments 
made by issuers to convenience users, card-accepting 
merchants who charge a single price for all purchases 
attract only liquidity-constrained consumers because 
some merchants charge a lower price and only serve 
cash-paying customers. Note, only those consumers 
who are liquidity-constrained use credit cards, and 
there is no convenience use. Third, if card issuers ex-
tend rebates to convenience users, a merchant can, 
under certain conditions, attract all types of consumers—
including consumers who carry a credit card balance 
month to month and those who do notwhen a sin-
gle price is charged. 
Chakravorti and To (2007) consider a scenario 
with monopolist merchants and a monopolist bank 
that serves both consumers and merchants where the 
merchants absorb all credit and payment costs in a 
two-period dynamic model.37 Consumer demand for 
consumption goods is inelastic. They focus on credit 
extended to consumers who face income uncertainty. 22 4Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
They depart from the payment card literature in the 
following ways. First, similar to Chakravorti and 
Emmons (2003), rather than taking a reduced form 
approach where the costs and benefits of payment 
cards are exogenously assigned functional forms,  
a model that endogenously yields costs and benefits 
to consumers, merchants, and banks from payment 
card use—that is, consumer credit—is specified. 
Second, the model uses a dynamic setting where 
there are intertemporal trade-offs for all of the parties 
involved. Third, they consider consumption and 
income uncertainty. 
Their model yields the following results. First,  
if merchants earn a sufficiently high profit margin and 
the cost of funds is sufficiently low, the economy is 
able to support credit cards. In other words, the benefits 
to consumers and merchants must be greater than the 
cost to support the credit card network. Second, the 
discount fee that merchants are willing to pay their 
banks increases as the number of credit-constrained 
consumers increases. Third, a prisoner’s dilemma 
situation may arise: Each merchant chooses to accept 
credit cards, but by doing so, each merchant’s 
discounted two-period profit is lower. In other words, 
there exists intertemporal business stealing among 
merchants across different industries, potentially 
resulting in all merchants being worse off. 
Models with competition among payment 
instruments 
Most of the literature ignores competition between 
payment instruments, with one payment provider of-
fering multiple payment options to its customers and 
setting prices to maximize profits. Moreover, most 
economic models of payment cards generally do not 
consider price incentives offered by merchants to steer 
consumers to certain types of card payments. Further-
more, much of the payment literature focuses on the 
extensive margin—how prices influence membership—
instead of the intensive margin—how prices affect usage.
In Bolt and Chakravorti (2008), we study the 
ability of banks and merchants to influence the con-
sumer’s payment instrument choice when they have 
access to three payment forms—cash, debit card, and 
credit card. To our knowledge, this model is the first 
to analyze payment network competition by combin-
ing elements of models that stress price balance with 
those that consider consumers’ liquidity constraints 
and security concerns. In addition, we consider how 
banks set prices when they participate in multiple 
payment networks.
In our model, consumers participate in payment 
card networks to insure themselves from three types 
of shocks—uncertain income flows, theft, and the mer-
chant they are matched to. Consumers only derive 
utility from consuming goods from the merchant they 
are matched to. Merchants differ on the types of pay-
ment instruments that they accept and the types of 
consumption goods that they sell. Unlike most two-
sided market models, where benefits are exogenous, 
we explicitly consider how consumers’ utility and mer-
chants’ profits increase from additional sales resulting 
from greater security and access to credit lines, and 
we consider the optimal allocation of those costs be-
tween consumers and merchants.38 Before the realiza-
tion of the three shocks, consumers are homogeneous. 
To focus on the intensive margin, we consider equi-
libriums where consumers have access to all three 
payment instruments. Each merchant chooses which 
instruments to accept based on its production costs, 
and each merchant is categorized as cash only, cash 
and debit card, or full acceptance (cash, debit card, 
and credit card). Merchant heterogeneity is based on 
differences in production costs. We consider the mer-
chants’ ability to pass on payment processing costs to 
consumers in the form of higher goods prices. 
Our key results can be summarized as follows. 
The structure of prices is determined by the level of 
the bank’s cost to provide payment services and the 
level of aggregate credit losses. We find that the opti-
mal strategy is for the bank to first fully extract con-
sumers’ surplus and then to extract merchants’ surplus. 
In addition, we identify equilibriums where the bank 
finds it profitable to offer one or both payment cards. 
Finally, uniform price policies increase bank profits 
when the bank supplies both types of payment cards 
than when merchants adopt pricing based on the pay-
ment instrument used. However, consumers and mer-
chants are worse off when consumers without liquidity 
constraints use credit cards because they do not receive 
the proper price incentives, resulting in use of a less 
efficient payment instrument.
Conclusion
In summarizing the payment card literature, we 
find that no single model is able to capture all the es-
sential elements of the market for payment services. 
It is a complex market with many participants engaging  
in a series of interrelated bilateral transactions. More-
over, determining appropriate pricing arrangements 
for payment instruments is difficult, since payment 
networks are subject to large economies of scale and 
give rise to strong usage and network externalities. 23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
NOTES
1These 11 countries are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and  
the United Kingdom.
2They study 13 countries—Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
3In this article, we define banks broadly as depository institutions.
4There are countries, for example, France, where the cardholder’s 
account is debited much later. These types of cards are referred to 
as delayed debit cards.
5For a summary of prepaid cards, see Chakravorti and Lubasi (2006).
6SEPA applies to all countries where the euro is used as the common 
currency. The implementation of SEPA started in January 2008 
with the launching of the SEPA credit transfer scheme and should 
be completed when all national payment instruments are phased 
out; these instruments may not be entirely phased out until 2013. 
7Beijnen and Bolt (2009) provide estimates of scale economies that 
quantify the potential benefits of SEPA arising from consolidation 
of electronic payment processing centers across the euro area. It is 
likely that SEPA will trigger substantial consolidation of payment 
infrastructures and processing operations across borders to allow 
banks and their customers—both consumers and merchants—to 
benefit from these cost efficiencies in the form of lower payment fees.
8According to some industry press reports, a major reason for 
Visa’s IPO is to shield itself from antitrust litigation (see Enrich, 
2006). Berry and Breitkopf (2006) also note that “as it was for 
MasterCard, the desire to reduce exposure to antitrust claims is  
a major factor in Visa’s plan to go public.”    
9For a summary of antitrust challenges in various jurisdictions, see 
Bradford and Hayashi (2008) and Weiner and Wright (2005). 
10On December 16, 2002, the Council of the European Union ad-
opted Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation 
of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (that is, the 1997 
consolidated version of the Treaty of Rome). The new regulation 
came into effect on May 1, 2004. For more discussion on the EC’s 
ruling on MasterCard, see Bolt (2008). 
11Payment networks are one type of two-sided market platform. 
Other types of two-sided market platforms include computer game 
platforms, newspapers, and online dating sites. These markets have 
platforms that provide goods and services to two distinct sets of 
end-users and must convince both sides—such as game developers 
and game users, newspaper readers and advertisers, and males and 
females—to participate. 
12An important empirical observation of two-sided markets is that 
platforms, generally, and payment networks, specifically, tend to 
heavily skew the price structure to one side of the market to get 
both sides “on board,” using one side as a “profit center” and the 
other side as a “loss leader,” or at best financially neutral. See Bolt 
and Tieman (2008) for an explanation for this phenomenon based 
on curvature of the demand functions.
13For a more general treatment of two-sided markets, see Armstrong 
(2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Jullien (2001), and Rochet and 
Tirole (2006).
14While not common, some merchants do post different prices based 
on the payment instrument used to make the purchase. For exam-
ple, some U.S. gas stations have started to discount cash prices re-
cently in response to shrinking profit margins. We discuss models 
that consider instrument-contingent pricing on pp. 19–20.
15There are two types of payment card networks—open (four-party) 
and proprietary (three-party) networks. Open networks allow many 
banks to provide payment services to consumers and merchants, 
whereas in proprietary networks, one institution provides services 
to both consumers and merchants. When the issuer is not also the 
Much of the debate over various payment card fees  
is concerned with the allocation of the surpluses from 
consumers, merchants, and banks, as well as who is 
able to extract surpluses from whom. 
We are able to draw the following conclusions. 
First, a side payment between the issuer and the ac-
quirer may be required to get both sides on board. There 
is no consensus among policymakers or economists 
on what constitutes an efficient fee structure for card 
payments. Second, while consumers generally react 
to price incentives at the point of sale, merchants are 
reluctant to charge higher prices to consumers who 
benefit from card use. Third, network competition 
may not improve the price structure but may signifi-
cantly reduce the total price paid by consumers and 
merchants. Fourth, consumers and merchants both 
value credit extended by credit card issuers (along 
with other benefits such as security), and consumers 
and merchants are willing to pay for it. 
Sound public policy regarding the allocation of 
payment fees is difficult. The central question is whether 
the specific circumstances of payment markets are such 
that intervention by public authorities can be expected 
to improve economic welfare. The efficiency of pay-
ment systems is measured not only by the costs of re-
sources used, but also by the social benefits generated 
by them. While the theoretical literature on the economics 
of payment cards is growing, the empirical literature 
is too limited to provide much guidance to policymakers. 
Public competition authorities around the world are 
considering or have imposed interchange fee regula-
tions, along with the removal of merchant pricing re-
strictions based on the type of payment instrument used. 
Eventually, the data from such cases where the authori-
ties have intervened may provide a useful “natural  
experiment” to test and refine the various theories 
discussed here. 24 4Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
acquirer, the issuer receives an interchange fee from the acquirer. 
Open networks have interchange fees, whereas proprietary systems 
do not have explicit interchange fees because one institution serves 
both consumers and merchants using that network’s payment ser-
vices. However, proprietary networks still must set prices for each 
side of the market to ensure that both sides are on board.
16In some instances, merchants are charged a fixed fee and a pro-
portional fee.
17Bolt, Humphrey, and Uittenbogaard (2008) show that Norway 
rapidly shifted from cash and paper-based instruments to electronic 
modes of payments by effectively applying differentiated bank 
payment pricing to consumers.
18These 12 countries are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
19Some key benefits of using cash include privacy and anonymity, 
which payment cards do not provide. 
20Carbó Valverde et al. (2008) conduct a similar exercise for Spain, 
and find that when summing net costs and benefits across partici-
pants, debit cards are the least costly and checks are the most costly, 
with credit cards and cash ranking second and third, respectively. 
21Chakravorti (2003), Evans and Schmalensee (2005), and Rochet 
(2003) provide excellent discussions of academic models of inter-
change fees.
22Net benefits for consumers and merchants are defined by the dif-
ference in benefits from using a payment card and using an alterna-
tive payment instrument. 
23Schmalensee (2002) defines the socially optimal interchange fee 
as the one that maximizes the sum of consumer and merchant sur-
plus. Such a measure is appropriate if card acceptance is not used 
as a strategic tool to steal customers from another merchant. 
24Schmalensee (2002) assumes that there are a single issuer and a 
single acquirer, demand curves are linear, and there are no fixed costs.
25The Hotelling merchants are spatially separated from their con-
sumers. A merchant can charge a lower price to capture the other 
merchant’s customers, but these customers may face an additional 
transportation cost to arrive at the merchant’s competitor. 
26Rochet and Tirole (2002) also consider some extensions regard-
ing merchant heterogeneity, differentiated prices for cards and 
cash, and system competition. 
27Carlton and Frankel (1995) extend Baxter (1983) by considering 
when merchants are able to fully pass on payment processing costs 
via higher consumption goods prices. They find that an interchange 
fee is not necessary to internalize the externality if merchants set pricing 
for consumption goods based on the type of payment instrument used. 
28No-surcharge rules do not allow merchants to impose surcharges 
for payment card purchases. However, merchants may still be al-
lowed to offer discounts for noncard payments. For more discus-
sion about no-surcharge rules and cash discounts, see Barron, Staten, 
and Umbeck (1992); Chakravorti and Shah (2003); Kitch (1990); 
and Lobell and Gelb (1981).
29For discussion about the reluctance of merchants to set different 
prices, see Frankel (1998). IMA Market Development AB (2000) and 
Bolt, Jonker, and Van Renselaar (2008) discuss the effect of remov-
ing no-surcharge rules in Sweden and the Netherlands, respectively. 
30The assumption here is that credit card transactions are more ex-
pensive in terms of explicit and implicit costs than other forms of 
payment. However, there are instances when card payments were 
discounted vis-à-vis cash payments. During the conversion to the 
euro, one German department store offered card discounts because 
of the high initial demand for euro notes and coins to make change 
for cash purchases (Benoit, 2002). 
31In Bertrand competition, two firms compete on price, resulting in 
each firm setting the price that would exist in perfect competition.
32For economic models that we discuss, no-surcharge rules are eco-
nomically the same as restricting merchants to charge the same 
price regardless of the payment instrument used, although the latter 
is a more restrictive policy.
33Carlton and Frankel (1995) discuss this cross-subsidy.
34In this context, rebates is a general term that captures incentives 
for consumers to use their cards, such as cash back and other  
frequent-use rewards.
35We limit our focus here to consumption credit. Payment credit—
the credit that is extended by the receiver of payment or a third party 
until the payment instrument is converted into good funds—is ignored. 
For more discussion, see Chakravorti (2007).
36For a breakdown of issuer revenue percentages, see Green (2008).
37Because Chakravorti and To (2007) ignore revolving credit (when 
cardholders carry a balance month to month), they consider the ex-
treme case of merchants covering all operating and credit default 
costs. Many consumers do not pay annual fees in the United States 
and about 40 percent do not carry debt, suggesting that their use is 
subsidized by others. In the United States, it is not unusual for mer-
chants to extend subsidized credit for large-value purchases that 
are below market rates, suggesting that some merchants are willing 
to subsidize consumer credit.
38McAndrews and Wang (2006) and Wang (2006) are notable ex-
ceptions. McAndrews and Wang (2006) find that payment card 
adoption costs, the distribution of consumer incomes, and firm size 
are key determinants of the structure of fees borne by each side. 
Their model predicts that large merchants accept both cash and 
cards, medium-sized merchants are specialized and only accept  
cash or cards (but not both), and small merchants only accept cash. 
In a similar model, Wang (2006) finds that card networks raise in-
terchange fees to maximize issuers’ profits as card payments be-
come more efficient. In equilibrium, consumer rewards and card 
transaction volume also increase, while consumer surplus and  
merchant profits may not. 25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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